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REVIEWABILITY AND THE “LAW OF RULES”:
AN ESSAY IN HONOR OF JUSTICE SCALIA
Adrian Vermeule*
INTRODUCTION
In Washington v. Trump,1 the Ninth Circuit decision on the Administration’s executive order on immigration,2 a critical moment occurred when the
panel had to explain why the order was reviewable at all. Precedents like
Kleindienst v. Mandel 3 had said that “when the Executive exercises [immigration authority] on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the
courts will [not] look behind the exercise of that discretion.”4 The panel’s
response was to invoke an important distinction between the reviewability of
general rules, on the one hand, and the reviewability of specific applications,
on the other:
[T]he Mandel standard applies to lawsuits challenging an executive branch
official’s decision to issue or deny an individual visa based on the application
of a congressionally enumerated standard to the particular facts presented
by that visa application. The present case, by contrast, is not about the application of a specifically enumerated congressional policy to the particular
facts presented in an individual visa application. Rather, the States are challenging the President’s promulgation of sweeping immigration policy. Such
exercises of policymaking authority at the highest levels of the political
branches are plainly not subject to the Mandel standard.5

As we will see, this conception of reviewability6—keyed to a distinction
between general policies or rules and specific applications, with the former
© 2017 Adrian Vermeule. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Essay in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Ralph S. Tyler Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School. Thanks to
John Manning and Jeff Pojanowski for helpful comments.
1 Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. Feb. 9, 2017) (per curiam).
2 Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017).
3 Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
4 Id. at 770.
5 Trump, 847 F.3d at 1162.
6 In administrative law, “reviewability” has both a narrow technical meaning and a
broader colloquial meaning. The narrow meaning involves the law surrounding the
Administrative Procedure Act’s (putative) presumption of reviewability and the exceptions
to that presumption stated in section 701(a)(1) and (2). See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2012).
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subject to review even if the latter would not be—is one that Justice Scalia
wrestled with throughout his reviewability jurisprudence. Yet it is more or
less directly the opposite of Justice Scalia’s own conception. Justice Scalia
developed a consistent approach to questions of reviewability: roughly, the
idea that “general programs” and “general policies” are to be excluded from
judicial review, and even general and legally binding agency rules may or may
not be reviewable before enforcement. On this approach, the proper business of courts is to review specific applications of agency rules to particular
parties. Notice that there are actually three possible subjects of review in play
here: nonbinding policies and rules (such as “interpretive” rules); binding
general rules (“legislative rules”); and applications. More on this shortly.
For now, the focus is on the distinction between review of general and specific agency action, whether that action is embodied in a legally binding rule
or in a nonbinding policy.
The approach featured in Washington v. Trump, by contrast, was propounded in several opinions by Justice John Paul Stevens. On that view,
agencies should be more afforded more, not less, discretion to apply policies
or rules in particular cases, whereas the proper business of the judiciary is to
review the general legality of overall programs, policies, and rules. The Scalia
view and the Stevens view obviously differ on the proper role of courts in an
overall system of administrative law. For Justice Stevens, the role of courts is
to say what the general rules of law are, leaving agencies (reasonable) discretion in application. For Justice Scalia, the role of courts is to decide cases,
reviewing the legality of rules only insofar as necessary to that function—as a
byproduct of deciding cases.
Furthermore, the two approaches differ as to the relationship between
reviewability and the idea—perhaps Justice Scalia’s most famous contribution
to legal theory—that the rule of law is best understood as “a law of rules.”7
On the Stevens view, reviewability should attempt to ensure that courts review
the overall legality of programs and policies to keep the administrative state
within the broad bounds of the rule of law.8 On that view, the “rule of law” is
a “law of rules” in the sense that judicial power to say what the law is entails a
power to examine the legality of general rules.
On the Scalia view, by contrast, the rule of law is a law of rules in a quite
different sense. The judicial role is to review particular “cases and controversies,” and the law of rules is a constraint on the sorts of reasons, grounds, or
The broader sense includes the narrow sense but adds any number of legal questions bearing on whether cases will be justiciable in court—questions of finality, ripeness, the “zone
of interests” analysis (sometimes called “statutory standing”), constitutional standing, and
even vague principles of interbranch comity and abstention. I will use “reviewability” in
the second, capacious sense. As we will see, Justice Scalia evolved a consistent approach
that expressed itself similarly under several different doctrinal rubrics.
7 See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
8 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844; cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due
Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 311 (1993) (articulating the goal of “keep[ing] government, overall and on average, tolerably within the
bounds of law”).
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rationales courts may use to decide such cases. The rule of law requires
courts to articulate grounds of sufficient generality that their disposition of
particular cases is not arbitrary or unreasoned. The grounds of judicial decisionmaking must not display an excessively ad hoc, case-specific character.
This conception underpins Justice Scalia’s hostility to balancing tests across
many areas of law.
Crucially, nothing in this conception is inconsistent with a conception of
reviewability that is narrower than the Justice Stevens conception. The Justice Scalia conception admits into court only agency action at the point of
specific application, but then demands that judges analyze the validity of that
specific application under general rules. For Justice Stevens, the rule of law
requires expansive judicial review of rules; for Justice Scalia, the rule of law,
qua law of rules, operates primarily as a constraint on the types of rationales
courts may give for their decisions of particular cases, once those cases are
already in court. Both conceptions are internally consistent, but they are also
opposites.
What difference does all this make? To see the main doctrinal difference between these two conceptions of reviewability, we have to clarify a tripartite distinction: between or among (1) review of nonbinding policies and
rules, (2) review of legally binding general rules, and (3) review of specific
applications. As Washington v. Trump explicitly indicates, and as Justice Stevens indicates as well in several decisions, one conception allows review of
nonbinding rules and policies that are otherwise sufficiently final and definite to be reviewable.9 These nonbinding rules and policies may or may not
have been formulated with valid statutory authority, adequate reasoning, and
so forth.
On Justice Scalia’s conception, by contrast, review of policies is never
acceptable; broad policies and programs, as we will see, do not amount to
reviewable agency “action.” Agency applications of binding rules to specific
9 For nonbinding rules and policies, of course, the challenging hurdle is finality. In
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997), Justice Scalia wrote for the Court to articulate a twopart finality test that would allow review of agency action only if that action both consummated the agency’s decisionmaking process, and produced “legal consequences.” Id. at
178. This might be thought to bar review of any nonbinding agency action whatsoever.
Later cases, however, have relaxed the apparent stringency of the requirement. See, e.g.,
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1807, 1815, 1816 (2016) (applying the finality test to allow review of an agency “jurisdictional determination” and emphasizing the “pragmatic” character of the test). The emphasis on practical consequences
creates space for review of nonbinding agency actions under at least some conditions,
where the agency has definitively settled on a position. See, e.g., Safari Club Int’l v. Jewell,
842 F.3d 1280, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (explaining that the finality test is satisfied where,
although agency action is nonbinding, the agency’s de facto position is “definitive” such
that “the writing is on the wall” (quoting Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 253
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted))). And indeed, a few years after writing for the Court in Bennett v. Spear, Justice Scalia himself wrote again for the Court and
found reviewable a nonbinding interpretive rule, because the agency had treated it as “conclusive.” See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 477–79 (2001).
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cases, as in enforcement actions, are the paradigm of reviewable action for
Justice Scalia. The hard case, then, involves the intermediate category (2):
review of general binding rules, for example notice-and-comment rules, before
they are applied in particular cases. In other words, the hard case involves
the Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner10 question: When and to what extent are
agency rules reviewable before they are enforced against particular parties?
On the Justice Stevens conception, of course, the answer is straightforward: pre-enforcement review is valid. Justice Scalia, by contrast, was reluctant to countenance pre-enforcement review, which threatens to undo his
distinction between general programs or policies and specific applications.
Justice Scalia, however, was constrained by the existence of adverse precedent, and generally acceded to pre-enforcement review, insofar as necessary.
In that sense, consistent with his overall approach to adjudication and precedent, his treatment of reviewability was “faint-hearted.”11
I. TWO CONCEPTIONS

OF

REVIEWABILITY—AND

OF THE

JUDICIAL ROLE

A. Review of Rules
Agencies typically (although not necessarily) formulate policies and programs premised on some conception of their legal authority, the boundaries
of their legal discretion; they enact general rules in pursuance of those programs; and they enforce the rules in particular cases. Given some commitment to preserving the rule of law, somehow defined, at which point or
points in this sequence should judicial review occur? Here too, I will focus
for the moment not on the threefold distinction among policies, rules, and
applications, but rather on the distinction between general (policies and
rules) and particular (applications). The differences among policies, rules,
and applications will be explored later, when we discuss pre-enforcement
review.
In the abstract, and stated at a very general level, two different
approaches to reviewability are possible. On one view, the important thing is
to ensure that the programs, policies, and rules of law under which the
agency is proceeding are valid as formulated on their face. If agencies are
formulating policies and rules that are generally invalid, there is a serious
problem, one that it is imperative for courts to oversee and correct. If agencies are applying valid policies incorrectly in particular cases, that is unfortunate, but less grave.
On this approach, the application of policies and rules to particular
cases is less important to review, for several reasons. First, the stakes are
inherently cabined and confined. The application of policies and rules in
particular cases can legally bind (if at all) only in the case at hand, whether
or not it has defensible precedential effect in other cases. With respect to
rules, the stakes are lower even if the rules are not formulated antecedently
10
11

Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 139–40 (1966).
See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
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in legislative style, through notice-and-comment proceedings, so that the
agency qua adjudicator formulates rules as rationales in the process of application. In that situation, rules function as precedents, but are still not so
binding as legislative rules; rules as precedents can be overturned in future
cases (if reasons can be given for doing so), or can be distinguished away,
whereas legislative rules are binding even upon the agency itself, unless and
until changed through the same notice-and-comment process that created
them.
Second, application of policies and rules to cases is mediated by agency
determination of particular facts (“adjudicative facts”). Judicial review of
adjudicative facts has always been deferential, especially in on-the-record proceedings where the “substantial evidence” test applies.12 The difference,
then, between a finding of reviewability and a finding of unreviewability is
less than it might otherwise be, if judicial review on the merits were plenary.
Third, policies and rules have effects that sweep well beyond the (small)
subset of applications that end up being litigated in court. The anticipated
effect of rules, even before they are enforced against anyone, is magnified
tenfold by compliance bureaucracies in firms and nonprofit institutions; “the
threat [of enforcement] is stronger than its execution.”13 In this practical
sense, law consists in the compliance effect of rules, and judicial review of
rules is necessary for there to be any judicially enforceable rule of law at all—
or so the argument would run. On this view, pre-enforcement review of
rules—permitted under certain circumstances by Abbott Laboratories—is essential.14 This turns out to be an important difference between the two conceptions, a point to which I will return below.
In a number of opinions (both for the Court, and separately), Justice
Stevens can be understood to have championed this conception. I will mention two of the most prominent. In McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., the
question was “whether § 210(e) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) . . . precludes a federal district court from exercising general federalquestion jurisdiction over an action alleging a pattern or practice of procedural due process violations by the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS).”15 The relevant statutory text said, in critical part, that “judicial review
of a determination respecting an [immigration] application” was barred.16
The government argued that the plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges to the
INS’s actions fell within the section; after all, the alleged violations did not
12 J. Skelly Wright, Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial Review, 59
CORNELL L. REV. 375, 391 (1974).
13 Edward Winter, A Nimzowitsch Story, CHESS NOTES (Jan. 31, 2017), http://www.chess
history.com/winter/extra/nimzowitsch.html (quoting the Grandmaster as saying that
“[t]he threat is stronger than its execution”).
14 See Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 144–46.
15 McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 483 (1991).
16 Id. at 486 n.6 (quoting Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-603, § 210(e), 100 Stat. 3359, 3421).
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occur out of thin air, but with respect to action on applications.17 Justice
Stevens, however, distinguished “judicial review of a determination respecting an application,”18 which he read to mean the application of general policies to particular cases, from what he called “general . . . challenges to
unconstitutional practices and policies used by the agency in processing
applications.”19 The latter were not covered by the statutory language. A
crucial rationale for this reading was that, if read more expansively, the result
would be “a total denial of judicial review of generic constitutional and statutory claims”20—which Justice Stevens treated as obviously unacceptable. The
word “generic,” as in “typical” and “general,” does important work here; Justice Stevens was implicitly concerned to protect a judicial role in keeping
government generally within the bounds of the law.
McNary cited and relied upon an earlier Justice Stevens opinion in a
domestic-benefits context: Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians.21
At issue were regulations under Part B of the Medicaid program, in particular
the question whether a provision for judicial review of any “determination of
the amount of benefits” under Part A precluded review under Part B by negative implication.22 The plaintiffs wanted to mount a general facial challenge
to the validity of the Secretary’s procedural method for calculating benefits.23 Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, sharply distinguished this sort of
general challenge to the overall program from a challenge to the amount of
individual determinations.24 The latter, he concluded, had been precluded,
but not the former.25
17 Id. at 491 (“Petitioners’ entire jurisdictional argument rests on their view that
respondents’ constitutional challenge is an action seeking ‘judicial review of a determination respecting an application for adjustment of status’ and that district court jurisdiction
over the action is therefore barred by the plain language of § 210(e)(1) of the amended
INA.” (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1160(e)(1) (2012))).
18 Id. at 486 n.6 (quoting Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 § 210(e)).
19 Id. at 492.
20 Id. at 497.
21 Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667 (1986).
22 Id. at 674 n.5 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(a) (1982)).
23 See id. at 668.
24 Id. at 674–78.
25 See id. at 680–81. In a later case, Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc.,
529 U.S. 1 (2000), the Court engaged in a confusing fight over the meaning of Bowen v.
Michigan Academy of Family Physicians. Justice Breyer’s opinion for the majority read Bowen
somewhat differently than I have described it in text, see id. at 15–20; Justice Thomas
argued in dissent that it undeniably did draw a distinction between programmatic challenges and challenges to individual determinations, see id. at 36–38 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, the author of Bowen, joined his dissent. Id. at 32. It seems to me that
Justice Thomas clearly had the better argument, and that the Court was reinterpreting
Bowen for the occasion. But the merits of that question aren’t essential for my enterprise
here, which is merely to outline the Justice Stevens conception and to show its operation in
a few real cases.
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B. Review of Application
Now let us turn to a different view altogether, championed by Justice
Scalia, also in a series of opinions. On this conception, federal judges sit to
decide particular “cases and controversies” litigated between parties, not to
arbitrate the validity of rules per se. Questions of rules’ validity may of course
arise in the course of deciding cases, when necessary to a decision. But judicial authority to decide such questions is essentially a byproduct of the
judges’ narrower commission.
Justice Scalia consistently argued for this approach, most famously in
cases of constitutional standing under the “case and controversy” requirement of Article III,26 but also in reviewability cases, properly so-called.
Indeed, we may see Justice Scalia’s reviewability jurisprudence as a sustained
attempt to read the reviewability provisions of the APA in accordance with
(his view of) background constitutional principles—a sustained application
of the canon that statutes should be read, where it is fairly possible to do so,
as constitutionally valid. Here too, I will confine myself to only two of the
many possible examples.
In Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation27—not to be confused with the
more famous standing opinion by Justice Scalia in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife28—the plaintiffs attempted to obtain review of a “land withdrawal review
program” initiated by the Department of the Interior and the Bureau of
Land Management (BLM).29 Justice Scalia laid out his approach to review of
“policies” and “programs,” and his approach to pre-enforcement review of
binding agency rules as well. I will therefore quote his opinion at some
length:
The term “land withdrawal review program” (which as far as we know is not
derived from any authoritative text) does not refer to a single BLM order or
regulation, or even to a completed universe of particular BLM orders and
regulations. It is simply the name by which petitioners have occasionally
referred to the continuing (and thus constantly changing) operations of the
BLM in reviewing withdrawal revocation applications and the classifications
of public lands and developing land use plans as required by the FLPMA. It
is no more an identifiable “agency action”—much less a “final agency
action”—than a “weapons procurement program” of the Department of
Defense or a “drug interdiction program” of the Drug Enforcement Administration. As the District Court explained, the “land withdrawal review program” extends to, currently at least, “1250 or so individual classification
terminations and withdrawal revocations.”
Respondent alleges that violation of the law is rampant within this program—failure to revise land use plans in proper fashion, failure to submit
certain recommendations to Congress, failure to consider multiple use, inordinate focus upon mineral exploitation, failure to provide required public
26
27
28
29

See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 875 (1990).
Lujan, 504 U.S. 555.
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. at 875 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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notice, failure to provide adequate environmental impact statements. Perhaps so. But respondent cannot seek wholesale improvement of this program
by court decree, rather than in the offices of the Department or the halls of
Congress, where programmatic improvements are normally made. Under
the terms of the APA, respondent must direct its attack against some particular “agency action” that causes it harm. Some statutes permit broad regulations to serve as the “agency action,” and thus to be the object of judicial
review directly, even before the concrete effects normally required for APA
review are felt. Absent such a provision, however, a regulation is not ordinarily considered the type of agency action “ripe” for judicial review under the
APA until the scope of the controversy has been reduced to more manageable proportions, and its factual components fleshed out, by some concrete
action applying the regulation to the claimant’s situation in a fashion that
harms or threatens to harm him. (The major exception, of course, is a substantive rule which as a practical matter requires the plaintiff to adjust his
conduct immediately. Such agency action is “ripe” for review at once,
whether or not explicit statutory review apart from the APA is provided.)
....
. . . Except where Congress explicitly provides for our correction of the
administrative process at a higher level of generality, we intervene in the
administration of the laws only when, and to the extent that, a specific “final
agency action” has an actual or immediately threatened effect. Such an
intervention may ultimately have the effect of requiring a regulation, a series
of regulations, or even a whole “program” to be revised by the agency in
order to avoid the unlawful result that the court discerns. But it is assuredly
not as swift or as immediately far-reaching a corrective process as those interested in systemic improvement would desire. Until confided to us, however,
more sweeping actions are for the other branches.30

In Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA),31 a rather similar
challenge to a wilderness-management program of the Bureau of Land Management, Justice Scalia amplified upon the separation of powers rationale for
his conception, noting that it serves a dual function: to protect agencies from
judicial arrogation of executive functions, and to protect judges from entanglement with problems unsuitable for judicial resolution:
The principal purpose of the APA limitations we have discussed—and
of the traditional limitations upon mandamus from which they were
derived—is to protect agencies from undue judicial interference with their
lawful discretion, and to avoid judicial entanglement in abstract policy disagreements which courts lack both expertise and information to resolve. If
courts were empowered to enter general orders compelling compliance with
broad statutory mandates, they would necessarily be empowered, as well, to
determine whether compliance was achieved—which would mean that it
would ultimately become the task of the supervising court, rather than the

30 Id. at 890–94 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v.
Burford, 699 F. Supp. 327, 332 (D.D.C. 1988)).
31 Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55 (2004).
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agency, to work out compliance with the broad statutory mandate, injecting
the judge into day-to-day agency management.32

Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation and Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness
Alliance together illustrate Justice Scalia’s commitments. Put technically,
agency programs and policies do not count as discrete “agency action” under
the APA, and are therefore not reviewable (unless some other avenue of
review happens to obtain). General rules may be reviewable under Abbott
Laboratories, but only so long as the rule practically requires a regulated party
to change his conduct immediately. Applications of rules in particular cases,
by way of enforcement, are the only category in which reviewability uncontroversially obtains—the opposite of Justice Stevens’s conception.
II. THE TWO CONCEPTIONS, COMPARED
What might be said on behalf of one conception or the other? I will try
as far as possible to focus on the considerations that are more or less specific
to the problem of reviewability in subconstitutional administrative law, as
opposed to larger background debates about constitutional standing. As I
have indicated, however, it is impossible fully to disentangle reviewability
from larger conceptions of the constitutional roles and spheres of courts and
agencies.33
On behalf of the Stevens view, it might be said that the basic task of the
federal courts, at least in the modern era, is to keep the administrative state
as a whole within the boundaries of law as a whole. On this view, the modern
era is defined by an allocation of authority between agencies and courts laid
out in Crowell v. Benson,34 Chief Justice Hughes’s grand attempt to lay down a
charter of demarcation for the boundaries of the administrative state. The
Crowell demarcation had a number of features; one of them was an important
distinction between de novo judicial authority to review (pure) questions of
law, on the one hand, and deferential review of questions of fact, on the
other.35 This distinction rests on an idea that questions of law are general,
whereas questions of fact are particular to the parties and the case at hand.
But why draw such a distinction in the first place? What motivates it? In
Crowell, Chief Justice Hughes’s main idea was that de novo judicial review of
legal rules was necessary to defend the rule of law from executive encroachment. Absent plenary judicial review of the legal validity of agency interpretation of statutes, the result would be “a government of a bureaucratic
character alien to our system.”36 Now, technically speaking, Crowell is not a
reviewability case (not least because, of course, it was decided fourteen years
32 Id. at 66–67.
33 As Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Webster v. Doe especially underscores. Webster v.
Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 606–21 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that even APA reviewability turns on underlying constitutional principles of the allocation of roles between
courts and the executive).
34 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
35 Id. at 46.
36 Id. at 57.
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before the enactment of the APA, under a regime of reviewability that was
both in flux and different than the APA regime).37 Its logic and rationale,
however, are not so easily cabined. Although Chief Justice Hughes’s reasoning was intended to justify de novo judicial review of legal questions on the
merits, it might easily be extended to the logically antecedent question
whether judges should have the authority to review agency legal interpretations in the first place.
On this approach, the crucial question would be whether reviewability is
necessary (or at least appropriate) to ward off the creation of a “government
of a bureaucratic character alien to our system.”38 To adapt an idea that
Richard Fallon has suggested in various neighboring doctrinal settings,39 one
might understand the master principle of reviewability doctrine to be that
the role of courts is to keep government as a whole within the boundaries of
law as a whole. This conception is deliberately framed in aggregate terms; it
looks to the courts to police the overall legality of the administrative state, in
a rough general way, even if particular agency actions stray near or even
across the lines of legality.
As such, the conception fits quite naturally with the distinction between
review of general agency rules that interpret statutes, on the one hand, and
review of agency adjudications that apply interpretations to facts determined
by the agency, on the other. The former sort of agency action governs a
broad range of cases, binds both the agency itself and all the world subject to
the rule, and induces compliance by a wide range of potentially regulated
parties. Indeed, under some circumstances, agencies may use the fact of having made a rule to foreclose subsequent challenges to the rule’s validity by
regulated parties, who—at least so long as they had an opportunity to challenge the rule when promulgated—may be remitted to arguing solely over
whether they have complied with the rule, not whether the rule itself is
valid.40 In this sense, general rulemaking by agencies is intrinsically more
consequential. The distinction is slightly complicated by the fact that agencies may of course issue legal interpretations in the course of adjudication.
Yet those interpretations are always revisable in subsequent adjudications, so
long as the agency gives a sufficient reason for doing so. The logical consequence of this picture is that judges should be more concerned to police
general agency interpretations, especially but not only in rulemaking, than to
police specific applications. And that is just what we see in Justice Stevens’s
jurisprudence.
So much for the animating motivations behind the Stevens view. What
might be said on behalf of the Scalia view? A great deal. A standard claim in
the literature—a claim whose truth is not my concern here, and that I will
not spend any time evaluating—is that the text and history of Article III,
37
38
39
course,
40

See Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946).
Crowell, 285 U.S. at 57.
See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Dis97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 53 (1997).
See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33, 39–45 (1964).
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particularly its “case and controversy” language, bar any general judicial oversight of the legal validity of governmental action, including constitutional
validity. Rather legal validity only ever becomes relevant in the course of
deciding claims and defenses in particular cases. Such claims may also be
tied to the larger structure of the Constitution, and to implicit constitutional
principles of the separation of powers.41
Put differently, if the Stevens view rests on a master principle—that
reviewability doctrine should allow judges to keep bureaucratic government
as a whole within the boundaries of law as a whole, in some aggregate
sense—then the Scalia view rests on a different, indeed competing, master
principle: the law itself includes restraints on the authority of courts to keep other
institutions within legal boundaries. As Justice Scalia’s analysis for the Court in
Norton v. SUWA indicates, those restraints are based in the separation of powers, and have a Janus-faced character, looking in two directions: they both
protect the executive from interference by courts in the exercise of its discretionary judgments about programs, and also protect the courts themselves
from the temptation to step beyond their area of constitutional and institutional competence, with risks of long-term harm.
If the consequence is that lawlessness at the level of program formulation goes unchecked by courts, that is doubtless a cost, but a cost that is
mitigated by two considerations. First, unchecked by courts need not mean
unchecked altogether, given the existence of congressional oversight and
other checks. Second, whenever the executive wants to bring its program to
the point of application, it will have to proceed in individual cases, at least
with respect to programs that involve enforcement, licensing, and resource
allocation as between competing claimants. In all these cases, the courts will
stand open to review legality at the point of application.
On this alternative conception, the ability of courts to police the legal
boundaries of the administrative state is not an end in itself, as in the Stevens
conception. Whereas under that conception courts are limited to an aggregate form of review that checks the validity of general agency rules, but leaves
agencies discretion to apply those rules to particular facts, the Scalia conception starts from the opposite end, implying that courts should be limited to
reviewing the legal validity of agency rules as applied in particular cases. As
we will see, however, Justice Scalia’s self-described “faint-heartedness”—his
willingness to abide by settled foundational precedents—caused him to compromise partially the strict logic of his view in an important class of cases
involving pre-enforcement review of agency rulemaking. Let me now turn to
that situation.

41 Bracketing the cogent view that there may not, in fact, be any such implicit general
principles. See generally John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124
HARV. L. REV. 1939 (2011).
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RULES

The operational difference between the two conceptions of reviewability
I have sketched comes to the fore with respect to pre-enforcement review of
agency rules under Abbott Laboratories—a theoretically crucial issue in administrative law, and one on which the Court is not as settled as the black-letter
textbooks would have it.42 The issue is crucial because pre-enforcement
review of rules has become one of the major constraints on the “rulemaking
revolution” of the 1960s and 1970s.43 Absent such review, regulated parties
would in many cases face a dilemma of compliance: obey now, or take action
in possible violation of the rule and wait until enforcement to raise claims
and defenses against the validity of agency action, at risk of suffering penalties for the violations if those claims and defenses fail. I do not say that it
would be necessarily wrong or unjustified to inflict such a dilemma on regulated parties; I do not mean to address the merits of pre-enforcement review
here. The only point is that such review is justified, if at all, as a means of
allowing parties to obtain a judicial ruling on legality in advance of crossing
the line between safe legality and possible violation. Of course, in order for
the petition for pre-enforcement review to be ripe, there must be some plausible threat of enforcement or other injury; just not a consummated injury.
On the Justice Stevens conception, pre-enforcement review of general
agency rules is straightforward; indeed the Justice Stevens conception, as in
Washington v. Trump, would even allow review of policies, in which case
review of notice-and-comment rules and other binding obligations follows a
fortiori. The more difficult question for the Justice Stevens conception is why,
or whether, there should be any limitations on pre-enforcement review at all,
at least so long as minimal Article III requirements (injury, causation, redressability, and adverseness) are satisfied. After all, whenever the agency
promulgates a general rule that purports to bind all the world, the rationale
behind the Justice Stevens conception—and behind Crowell v. Benson—is
fully implicated. Absent pre-enforcement judicial review, the argument
would run, regulated parties are in effect coerced de facto into compliance
with administrative commands. In that sense, they will be subjected to “government of a bureaucratic character,” which Crowell insisted is “alien to our
system.”44
The Supreme Court, however, has never gone that far. It has insisted,
ever since Abbott Laboratories, that pre-enforcement review is available when
there is a concrete practical effect on regulated parties.45 The main doctrinal controversy in recent years has concerned the conditions under which
42 Compare McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479 (1991) (holding preenforcement review available), with Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200 (1994),
and Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1 (2000) (both holding preenforcement review unavailable).
43 See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking and the Administrative Procedure Act, 32
TULSA L. REV. 185 (1996).
44 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 57 (1932).
45 See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1966).
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pre-enforcement review will be unavailable—more specifically, whether the
Court’s “presumption of reviewability” creates a strong presumption that preenforcement review is available, or instead is fully satisfied so long as either
pre-enforcement or post-enforcement review is available. In Shalala v. Illinois
Council on Long Term Care, Inc., Justice Scalia even denied there is such a
presumption in the Abbott Laboratories situation:
With regard to the timing of review, I would not even use the word “presumption” (a term which Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner applies only to the
preference for judicial review at some point), since that suggests that some
unusually clear statement is required by way of negation. In my view, preenforcement review is better described as the background rule, which can be
displaced by any reasonable implication (“persuasive reason to believe,” as
Abbott Laboratories put it) from the statute.46

Overall, then, while Justice Scalia attempted to nudge doctrine away
from a strong version of Abbott Laboratories, he never refused to follow the
basic holding of that decision.47 That stance is very much in line with Justice
Scalia’s self-described “faint-hearted[ness]” about entrenched precedent.48
It should not, however, obscure the logic of his approach to reviewability,
which looks askance at judicial review of general rules in advance of their
application to particular parties. The crucial qualification that Justice Scalia
underscored in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation—that pre-enforcement
review is available when regulated parties are compelled to change their
behavior by the threat of enforcement—can be justified, on his approach, as
an attempt to limit pre-enforcement review to situations where an “application” of the rule at least has occurred extrajudicially, in an extended metaphorical sense, if not in court. Not a perfect substitute, but apparently a
tolerable one for Justice Scalia.
Confirmation of this picture is that when the question involved preenforcement review of targeted agency determinations rather than general
policies or rules, the Justice had no qualms about expansive reviewability.
Consider targeted agency determinations like the EPA “compliance orders”
46 Shalala, 529 U.S. at 32 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Abbott
Labs., 387 U.S. at 140).
47 See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. 531 U.S. 457, 479 (2001) (applying
Abbott Laboratories to allow pre-enforcement review of an interpretive rule). Even there,
however, the Justice was clear to write as narrowly as possible, tying the outcome in part to
special statutory features of the Clean Air Act:
Whether or not this would suffice in an ordinary case brought under the review
provisions of the APA, we have characterized the special judicial-review provision
of the CAA as one of those statutes that specifically provides for “preenforcement” review. Such statutes, we have said, permit “judicial review directly, even
before the concrete effects normally required for APA review are felt.” The
effects at issue here surely meet that lower standard.
Id. at 479–80 (citations omitted) (quoting Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 891
(1990)).
48 Scalia, supra note 11, at 862.
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that the Court, with Justice Scalia writing, held reviewable in Sackett v. EPA49
in what was (technically at least) a pre-enforcement posture. The distinction
between the Justice’s approach in Sackett, on the one hand, and on the other
his patent reluctance to license pre-enforcement review of general rules, in
both Lujan and Illinois Council, is that the former involved something much
closer to the adjudicative application of general policies to particular facts
than did the latter. It thus fell on the reviewable side of Justice Scalia’s basic
conceptual distinction.
IV. “THE RULE

OF

LAW

AS A

LAW

OF

RULES”

Let me turn, finally, to a last point about Justice Scalia’s theoretical contributions. Perhaps the most famous claim Justice Scalia ever advanced—
certainly in extrajudicial writing—is that the “rule of law” can be understood
as a “law of rules.”50 What connection does this have to the reviewability of
rules in administrative law? Which of our two conceptions does this claim
about the rule of law support?
One might argue, with some superficial plausibility, that if the rule of
law is a law of rules, judges had better have the authority to review general
and therefore rule-like agency action—certainly in advance of agency
enforcement in particular cases, when agencies make binding general rules
through rulemaking, but perhaps even earlier, when agencies formulate general policies. On this view, understanding the essence of the rule of law as
rule-like generality implies that in order to keep government within the
bounds of law, courts must be able to examine rules wherever they are to be
found. (Ceteris paribus, of course; if there are special circumstances, such as
the presence of sensitive national security or foreign policy concerns, then
reviewability may be defeated on those grounds, but only on those grounds.)
I don’t think this is the best conception, however, once we attempt to fit
Scalia-qua-scholar together with Scalia-qua-judge, treating the two as presumptively consistent. Despite its framing as a claim about the rule of law in
itself, as it were, apart from which judges or apart from which institutional
forums apply law, Justice Scalia’s claim is best understood as judge-referential—as primarily addressing the judicial role and judicial behavior. Indeed,
Justice Scalia so announces right at the beginning of his famous article, saying that “[the] particular value of having a general rule of law is beside the
point. For I want to explore the dichotomy between general rules and personal discretion within the narrow context of law that is made by the courts.”51
If others have misunderstood Justice Scalia, that is their fault, not his. He is
not addressing the jurisprudence of rules qua rule, or the topic of rules versus standards52 in general—hanging in the air. Rather he is addressing a
49 Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1374 (2012).
50 Scalia, supra note 7.
51 Id. at 1176.
52 See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557 (1992).
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much narrower (albeit still critical) topic: decision-procedures for adjudication in Article III courts. And this understanding fits seamlessly with his overall approach to reviewability, which attempts—insofar as is possible under
extant doctrine—to confine courts to review of the application of general
rules to particular cases.
On this understanding, what work does the commitment to seeing the
rule of law as a “law of rules” actually do? It works, not as a statement of what
counts as a legal rule the judges may assess for validity, but rather as a constraint on the types of rationales the judges may offer when a case or controversy is
properly before them. The “law of rules” vision is that, when deciding upon
a case that reviews the application of a general rule to particular facts, the
judges are constrained to offer rationales that operate at a sufficiently high
level of generality above, as it were, the facts of the particular case. The
judge must offer a rationale that derives from and embodies a ‘clear rule of
decision’ based on “general principles.”53 The advantages of this approach,
for Justice Scalia, were that general rules provide clarity and predictability;
embolden judges in future cases by giving them a clear rule to point to;
and—most interesting of all—tie the judges’ own hands against unprincipled
political opportunism in future cases.
When combined with Justice Scalia’s approach to reviewability, discussed
earlier, the result is faintly paradoxical, although there is no flaw in the logic
(whether or not Justice Scalia’s conception is ultimately correct as well as
coherent—an issue I am bracketing). The combination is seemingly paradoxical because it looks in two directions simultaneously. At the stage of
reviewability, it attempts to filter out judicial scrutiny of general policies and
even (to the extent consistent with Abbott Laboratories) judicial scrutiny of general binding rules, until they are applied in particular cases. The approach at
this stage is to cabin judges to particular applications in particular cases.
Once the hurdle of reviewability is leapt over and the merits are reached,
however, the combined conception turns right around and attempts to raise
rather than lower the level of generality of judicial action—requiring judges
to offer rules of decision that are general and binding, including binding on
the judges themselves.
When we bring Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence of reviewability together
with his jurisprudence of rules, then, a coherent vision emerges. Insofar as
prevailing doctrine allows (in other words, subject to the constraint of Abbott
Laboratories), federal judges must decide only specific applications to specific
cases, but must decide those specific cases only on the basis of general rules.
The opposite of this conception is a judge who wants broad scope for judicial
review of general rules, pre-enforcement, or even broad agency policies, and
yet who also thinks that judicial restraint often counsels relatively case-specific or narrow rationales for decision. (Justices Stevens, O’Connor, and
Ginsburg are all plausible candidates for this combination of views.) I believe
that both positions hang together coherently, and that the choice between
53

Scalia, supra note 7, at 1185.
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them must be made on extrinsic grounds. This is not the place to arbitrate
that dispute; my aim has been merely to elicit the logic of Justice Scalia’s
view, which I believe to be distinctive, coherent, and undeniably plausible.

